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Back in 2007, the Iowa Law &view published a dialogue between Graeme 
Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, on the one hand, and Stacey Dogan and Mark 
Lemley on the other. 1 The topic was "trademark use," and the question was 
whether such a doctrine really exists. Dinwoodie and Janis said no-that while 
only commercial use of a trademark can be considered infringing, there is no 
threshold requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant has used 
the mark in some particular "trademark" way. 2 Dogan and Lemley said yes 
-that some "uses" of a mark simply don't trigger liability, and a court needs 
to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the defendant has used the mark 
"as a brand."3 I was not a disinterested bystander on this question. When I 
wrote, responding to both papers, I argued that trademark law does, and 
must, impose liability for only particular kinds of uses of a mark-uses "as a 
mark."4 But because "trademark use" can only be determined from the 
perspective of consumers, I argued, the question of whether a particular use 
qualifies inevitably collapses into the likelihood of confusion analysis (and 
therefore isn't a separate, threshold question.)s 
The impetus for this now well-cited exchange was a series of cases in 
which the issue was whether a party that delivers keyword advertisements 
infringes a mark owner's rights by selling to competitors the right to have their 
ads triggered by keywords that correspond to the plaintiffs trademark.6 In the 
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1. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in 
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie &Janis I]; Stacey L. Dogan 
& Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669 
(2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 1703 (2007) [hereinafter Dinwoodie &Janis II]. 
2. Dinwoodie &Janis I, supra note 1, at 1602-03. 
3. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1676. 
4. Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773-78. 
5. Id. Likelihood of confusion is evaluated using a multifactor test that considers, among 
other things, the similarity of the parties' marks, the similarity of the parties' goods or services, 
the likelihood that the plaintiff will "bridge the gap" between the parties' respective goods or 
services, and the defendant's intent. See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 146-48 
(2d Cir. 2003). 
6. Compare Buying for the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 
(D.NJ. 2006) (holding keyword use by advertisers constitutes trademark use in commerce), and 
Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, at *3 (D. 
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years following the trademark use debate, courts largely sided with Dinwoodie 
and Janis (or, I think more accurately, with me)-rejecting the contention 
that trademark use is a separate, threshold requirement.7 That doesn't mean 
that courts typically have found keyword advertising uses to be infringing. In 
the main, courts have held defendants' sales of keywords for advertising non-
infringing, though they usually have reached that result by finding that the 
defendants' conduct was not likely to cause confusion. 8 
Still, for most trademark lawyers, the idea that there's no such thing as 
"trademark use" always seemed wrong. In fact, trademark use is everywhere in 
trademark law-in cases dealing with acquisition of common law rights, in 
priority disputes, in infringement cases, and in cases involving a variety of 
defensive doctrines. And, as Alex Roberts details in her excellent article 
Failure to Function, even more pervasively in the registration context.9 
The problem is that trademark use is only at issue when it's lacking; when 
it's present, it's invisible. In this respect it should be no surprise that the 
Trademark Office has no real theory of trademark use, only a rule that 
prohibits registration when the claimed mark fails to function as a mark. 
Trademark use is also primarily a functional consideration; an indicator has 
been "used as a mark" when, by virtue of its use, consumers are likely to regard 
it as source-indicating. Because that is an empirical question for which the 
Trademark Office typically has no empirical evidence, failure to function has 
a sort of "know it when you see it" quality. Indeed, the Trademark Manual of 
Examining Procedure describes a purported mark's failure to function 
primarily by reference to other functions performed the claimed matter-the 
theory being that we can identify when matter fails to function as a mark by 
determining whether the matter has some other function in relation to the 
goods or services. So, for example, a claimed mark might fail to function as a 
Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (holding the same), with Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 
425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding keyword use is not trademark use in 
commerce). Cornpare Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-
909-A, 2002 WL 31356645, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 16, 2002) (holding use of keywords to trigger 
adware constitutes trademark use in commerce), with 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 
414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding use of keywords to trigger adware is not trademark 
use in commerce), and Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 764 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003) (holding the same), andU-Haul Int'!, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 
729 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding the same). 
7. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 139-41 (2d Cir. 2009). 
8. sJ. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 25A:7 
(5th ed. 2019) ("Almost all District Courts have found that no likelihood of confusion was caused 
by the purchase of keywords alone." ( citing cases)). 
9. Alexandra]. Roberts, Trademark Failure to Function, 104 IOWAL. REV. 1977, 1985-86 (2019). 
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mark "because it is merely ornamentation," 10 or "informational matter," 11 or 
a "model or grade designation." 12 
Against this background, Roberts advances three arguments: ( 1) use as a 
mark is undervalued as a theoretical and practical matter; 1 3 ( 2) that is at least 
in part because we lack sufficiently clear rules for determining use as a mark; 1 4 
and (3) courts and the Trademark Office should merge considerations of 
distinctiveness and use as a mark such that the two are considered to be 
interdependent and inversely related (the less distinctive a term, the more 
evidence of use as a mark are needed, and vice versa). 1 s 
On the first point, Roberts notes that eligibility for registration depends 
not only on distinctiveness (whether the purported mark is the sort of thing 
that is capable of designating source), but on the applicant's use of that mark 
in a source-designating way. 16 That is to say that registrability is not only about 
whether the mark is ownable, but whether it is in fact owned by the party who 
claims it. The question here is about the qualitative characteristics of the use, 
not merely whether the claimant has made enough of it. No amount of use 
will suffice if it is not the right kind. 
The difficulty is, of course, in determining what counts as the "right kind" 
of use. Here Roberts criticizes the Trademark Office and T.T.A.B. for failing 
to develop clear guidance, which she attributes to their overemphasis on 
distinctiveness. 1 7 
Without use as a mark, there can be no trademark, and consequently 
no trademark rights. Yet distinctiveness has received the lion's share 
of attention, generating rules and tests applied in thousands of cases 
and USPTO decisions and discussed in hundreds of articles, books, 
and practice guides. A term's inherent qualities are often treated as 
the sole predictor of whether consumers will understand it as a mark. 
At the same time, the USPTO and federal courts have struggled to 
articulate and a apply a clear standard for use as a mark and 
endeavored to separate it from distinctiveness. 18 
I agree with Roberts that use as a mark is underplayed in many discussions 
of trademark registration. But it is hard to know whether it is 
underappreciated by the Trademark Office. According to Roberts, the Office 
10. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
§ 1202.03 (2018). 
11. Id. at§ 1202.04. 
12. Id. at§ 1202.16(a). 
13. See Roberts, supra note 9, at 1989. 
14. Id. at 2016. 
15. Id. at 2039-40. 
16. Id. at 1994-95. 
17. Id.at1986-87. 
18. Id. at 1982 (citations omitted). 
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issued 26,450 failure to function refusals between 2003 and 2016. 1 9 Since it 
is impossible to know how many refusals it should have issued, it is difficult to 
put that number in perspective. To be sure, Roberts discusses several instances 
in which the Trademark Office (perhaps erroneously) missed the opportunity 
to reject an application on failure to function grounds. Meanwhile, she notes, 
distinctiveness is evaluated in "thousands of cases and USPTO decisions." 20 
But some errors are inevitable in a system that processes so many applications, 
and we have neither a sense of how frequently failure to function rejections 
were missed nor a baseline against which to evaluate that error rate. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, there may be good reasons for the 
Trademark Office to focus primarily on distinctiveness. Examining attorneys 
base their judgments regarding use as a mark on a single specimen of use 
-they can't, and don't even attempt to, determine how the applicant 
generally uses the claimed mark. As a result, accepting that the claimed mark 
functions as a mark really just means accepting that the claimant used it as a 
mark in that one instance. Distinctiveness is in this way much more suited to 
the registration context, because distinctiveness deals with characteristics that 
depend less on the specific details of the claimant's use. 21 In that respect, use 
in the registration context isn't really a proxy for how consumers will see uses 
of the mark in general; it's just a way of making sure the mark can be and has 
been used in a way that would lead consumers to draw a source conclusion. 
Roberts is certainly right that there are no clear rules for determining use 
as a mark. It seems unlikely, however, that the Trademark Office could do 
much better given modern law's functional understanding of the concept. As 
Roberts acknowledges, use as a mark is ultimately determined from the 
perspective of consumers.22 Since it is not feasible in the registration context 
to test that understanding with survey evidence, the best examining attorneys 
can do is rely on rules of thumb. 2 3 Roberts suggests that Office could look to 
empirical studies to learn at the wholesale level what sorts of clues consumers 
rely on to draw source conclusions. But as it turns out, the features that 
19. Id. at 1981 n.13. 
20. Id. at 1982. 
21. This is obviously an overstatement, in the sense that usage often informs the extent to 
which the mark describes, or is generic for, the goods for which it is claimed. But to the extent 
that is true, use as a mark is already necessarily part of the distinctiveness analysis, whether or not 
evaluated as a distinct consideration. 
22. Roberts, supra note 9, at 2018. Or at least that is what the law purports to do. For the 
most part, the law embeds assumptions about consumer behavior, and significant recent research 
has demonstrated that many of those assumptions are incorrect. See Jake Linford, Are Trademarks 
Ever Fanciful?, 105 GEO. LJ. 731, 757 (2017);Jake Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive 
and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. LJ. 1367, 1419 (2015); Mark P. McKenna, Testing Modern 
Trademark Law's Theory of Harm, 95 IOWA L. REV. 63, 94 (2009). But even if its assumptions are 
wrong and perhaps even mask other normative goals, the law lacks any vocabulary for alternative 
orientation, and Roberts embraces the idea that use as a mark is ultimately about consumer 
understanding. 
23. Roberts, supra note 9, at 2019-20. 
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literature emphasizes correspond reasonably well to those the T.T.A.B. has 
highlighted. Specifically, the empirical research suggests that consumers 
focus on features like shape, color, prominence, font, and marketing context 
in drawing conclusions about whether particular words or other indicators 
serve as branding elements. 2 4 Those are the same sorts of contextual clues on 
which the PTO focuses, as Roberts notes. 2s 
The problem, then, doesn't seem to be that the law hasn't identified the 
right proxies. It's more that proxies are only proxies, and functional 
evaluation resists predictable application. So it is with much of modern 
trademark law. The more holistic and robust use as a mark doctrine that 
trademark law once employed was tractable precisely because the law used to 
have a much stronger formalist dimension. 26 
Roberts's argument for combining use as a mark and distinctiveness is an 
intriguing one. Given the empirical evidence demonstrating that contextual 
clues have a strong effect on consumer perception of source indication, 
there's an obvious logic to making the Abercrombie categories (which are based 
on assumptions about consumer reaction that aren't empirically supported) 
less determinative. 2 7 
There are a couple of reasons to be concerned, however. First is that, to 
the extent use as a mark is unclear, combining it with distinctiveness will only 
embed the lack of clarity in a more complicated analysis. Absent better tools 
for identifying use as a mark (formal tools that Roberts may resist), it seems 
unlikely that combining that concept with distinctiveness will lead to clearer 
or better results. 
Second, neither the concept of distinctiveness nor the Abercrombie 
methodology are motivated solely by assumptions about consumer 
understanding of particular types of terms. Descriptive terms (and other 
terms assimilated to that category) were once not considered trademark 
subject matter (categorically), and that wasn't because courts assumed those 
terms could never indicate source. Indeed, unfair competition actions were 
available to parties using descriptive terms when they could prove the terms 
did, in fact, indicate source, and that others were using the terms to divert 
24. Id. at 2020-24. As she notes, one empirical "study found that context-the common 
indicators of trademark use ... such as large, stylized font and prominent placement-had a 
substantial effect on consumer perception." Id. at 2020 (citing Thomas R Lee et al., An Empirical 
and Consumer Psychology Analysis ofTradernarkDistinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1033, 1039-54 (2009) ). 
25. Id. at 2003-04. See also MCCARTHY, supra note 8, at§ 3=4 ("Some of the common markers 
of whether a word, phrase or picture is being used as a trademark are: larger-sized print, all capital 
letters or initial capitals, distinctive or different print style, color, and prominent position on label 
or in advertising."). 
26. See Mark P. McKenna, Property & Equity in Tradernark, 24 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020). 
27. The Abercrombie categories, first described in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, 
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976), are used to determine the distinctiveness of marks by placing 
them in categories according to the relationship between the mark and the good. 
110 IOWA LAW REVIEW ONLINE 
customers. Descriptive terms were excluded from trademark proper because 
they didn't automatically indicate source, and because others had potentially 
legitimate reasons to use those terms. The prospect of legitimate use by 
competitors remains a concern with respect to these terms, and as a result, 
there remain good reasons to discourage claiming of descriptive terms even 
if they could be used in a way that indicates source. 
A related concern has to do with the reason distinctiveness tends to 
dominate in the registration process in the first place-namely the fact that 
use as a mark is determined only by what is shown in the specimen, while that 
use can support registration of the mark in much broader form. Take, for 
example, an application to register "wonderful" in block letters for cookies. 
Imagine that application is supported by a specimen showing prominent use 
of that highly descriptive term in a stylized format with notable colors. When 
the Trademark Office emphasizes distinctiveness, it can easily reject the 
application on descriptiveness grounds. But if it were to combine use as a 
mark and distinctiveness, the Office might acknowledge the possibility that 
the context of the applicant's use would lead consumers to treat the otherwise 
descriptive term as a trademark and therefore register the mark. Note, 
however, that the registration would issue for the mark in block letters 
-a format lacking all of the context that might make consumers regard it as 
a source in the context of the specimen. The benefits of registration then 
would accrue to the mark as registered, and it could be enforced against even 
very different uses. 
For that reason, the attractiveness of combining use as a mark and 
distinctiveness is largely a function of the feasibility of Roberts's "radical" 
proposal that courts limit the scope of protection (or at least limit the import 
of the registration) to the uses identified in the specimens.28 Put differently, 
if we are to determine registrability primarily on the basis of the use shown in 
the specimen, then perhaps we ought to treat the specimen as the claim. 2 9 
Doing so would introduce greater coherence to the system as a whole-which 
currently is of two minds about the significance of registration.3° 
One recent case provides some hope in this respect, and some reason to 
think Roberts's proposal might not be all that radical after all. In LTTB, LLC 
v. &dbubb'-e, Inc.,31 the plaintiff owned incontestable trademark registrations 
for LETTUCE TURNIP THE BEET for, among other things, various clothing 
items.32 When LTTB initially applied to register that phrase, it submitted 
specimens showing use "in a large font across the center of the packing box, 
28. Roberts, supra note 9, at 2043. 
29. For more on claiming challenges in trademark law, see Jeanne C. Framer & Mark P. 
McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 146-60 (2018). 
30. See Rebecca Tushnet, Registering Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark 
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 878-81 (2017). 
31. LTTB, LLC v. Redbubble, Inc. 385 F. Supp. 3d 916,916 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
32. Id. at 917. 
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tote bag, and shirts."33 The Trademark Office rejected the application on the 
ground the claimed mark failed to function since it was merely ornamental, a 
rejection LTTB overcame only when it submitted different specimens 
showing use of the mark on product labels or "hang tags."34 But then LTTB 
sought to enforce its mark against a company that operated a marketplace on 
which third parties sold products (including t-shirts) bearing the phrase 
"Lettuce Turnip the Beet."3s The court rejected LTTB's claim, emphasizing 
that the Trademark Office only allowed registration ofLTTB's mark when it 
could show a different kind of use than the one to which it was objecting.36 
According to the court, Redbubble's defense "either implicat[ed] the 
rule that 'decorative or ornamental' features are not subject to trademark 
protection or the exclusion for 'aesthetic functionality."'37 The rule about 
decorative or ornamental features is, of course, only a rule of registration. 
Aesthetic functionality is the analogous validity concept in infringement 
actions, and the court's uncertainty about the relationship between those two 
concepts reflects a broader uncertainty about the relationship between 
registration and infringement. What's unusual about the court's approach is 
that courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have been reluctant to invoke 
aesthetic functionality in cases in which the defendant claims, not that the 
mark is invalid, but that it simply can't be enforced against the defendant's 
use.38 But that reluctance was not in evidence here. The Trademark Office 
denied L TTB registration when L TTB could only show use of the phrase on 
the front of its products, concluding that sort of use is not "use as a mark."39 
LTTB could not overcome that refusal by showing a different type of use but 
then turn around and enforce its rights against a defendant making the very 
same kind of non-trademark use for which it was denied registration. 
LTTB obtained its registration by submitting samples showing the 
claimed brand name being used on labels and hangtags. Were some 
competitor to use a brand name in similar fashion that created a 
likelihood of confusion, liability might follow. LTTB may not, 
however, recover for alleged trademark infringement based on any 
33. Id. at 919. 
34· Id. 
35. Id. at 917. 
36. Id.at921-22. 
37. Id. at 920. 
38. Id. at 921. ("Redbubble does not suggest that LTTB's registered trademarks are per 
seinvalid, and nothing in this order should be construed as so holding. Redbubble instead 
appropriately frames the argument as precluding LTTB from showing a likelihood of confusion 
as to source, where the mere use of the pun on the face of various products cannot be source-
identifying."). 
39. Id.at919. 
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competitors' use of the very kind of designs that the PTO found not 
to be eligible for trademark protection.4° 
The LTTB court framed its decision in aesthetic functionality terms, but 
this is trademark use by another name. And even if the court's specific 
approach does not stand, its instinct to rely on the specimen to limit the scope 
of registered trademark rights is an important one. If Roberts's focus on use 
as a mark can help push a broader rethinking of the relationship between 
registration and infringement, that will be a significant accomplishment. 
40. Id. at 92 1. 
